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1. INTRODUCTION
Experience has erased most doubts about the Internet's value as
an important new global marketplace and political arena. This new
marketplace presents low economic barriers to entry, but uncertainty
about remedies when electronic deals go bad may impede full realiza-
tion of the Internet's potential. Deployment of new hybrid forns of
international regulation of commerce can reduce these non-economic
barriers.
2. ECONOMICCHARACrERISTICS OF TEE NEW MARKETPLACE
The Internet is but the latest collection of electronic tools for en-
gaging in commerce at a distance. A century and a half ago, the
Morse telegraph reinforced railroad and other transportation technol-
ogy breakthroughs to enlarge the geographic reach of buyers and sell-
ers. These breakthroughs led to the standardization of consumer
goods and the creation of national and international markets in agri-
cultural commodities and raw materials. Harmonization of commer-
cial law regimes and development of commodities and stock ex-
changes resulted.'
During the last century, acceptance of the telephone, for point-to-
point communication, and radio and television broadcasting improved
coordination within large-scale enterprises. This reduced their relative
transaction costs in comparison with the transaction costs of market-
coordinated transactions and created incentives for enterprise consoli-
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1 See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 231 (1973)
(reporting on "unification" of commercial law as an economic development that oc-
curred in nineteenth century.
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dation.2 The same technological innovations made it possible for
mass advertising to stimulate consumer demand?
In the last fifty years, diffusion of digital computer and telecom-
munications technologies has allowed enterprises to automate their
accounting, inventory, and operations management functions, thus
improving productivity and profitability.
The Internet, first significant to business-to-consumer and busi-
ness-to-business commercial relationships in the mid-1990s, has char-
acteristics that shape the first comprehensive electronic marketplace
suitable for exchanges of most goods and services.
2.1. LozerEnonicBanim toEntry
Declining prices for basic components of networked computing4
combined with increasing speeds of data transfer and the wide scale
acceptance of universal, mostly nonproprietary layered' technical
standards,6 allow for lower economic bariers to entry for merchants
and consumers. Consumers can shop worldwide for little more than
one thousand dollars for a personal computer and ten to twenty dol-
lars per month for Intemet service. They no longer need to take the
2 See ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., STRATEGY AND STRucTuRE 27-28 (MI.T.
Press 1978) (1962) (analyzing effect of technology on expanding markets and enter-
prises); Oliver E. Williamson, Public ani Prizte Buacracies: A Tramaaion C6t Eco-
nos Pemspa"ti, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 306, 311-15 (1999) (summarizing transaction
cost theory of firm).
3 See gura/y Frank X Taney, Reurwitg the Law cfReale Prie Mainemann, 143 U.
PA. L. REv. 321, 372 n.262, 377 (1994) (discussing tlie effect on treatment of resale
price maintenance of the courts' adopting a transaction cost economics perspective);
YANNIs BAKOS, REDUCING MARKET SEARCH COST: IMPICATIONS FOR
ELECIRONIC COMMERCE, at http://www stern.nyu.edu/ -bakos/emkts.html (uly
1996) (noting that new forms of information can serve as intermediaries between
buyers and sellers).
4 Basic components include: processors, storage, and digital communication
interfaces, including network interface cards and routers.
5 The Open Systems Interconnection ("0S1") model exemplifies a layered net-
work architecture. Layer 7 defines the application layer. Layer 6 defines the pres-
entation layer. Layer 5 defines the sessionlayer. Layer 4 defines the transport layer.
Layer 3 defines the network layer. Layer 2 defines the data link layer. Layer 1 de-fies the physical layer. IP operates at Layer 3. Transition Control Protocol
(TCP") operates at Layer 4. Ethemet operates at Layers 1 and 2. See OSI, at
htp://whatis.com/WhatIs Definition Page/0,4152,212725,00.html (last updated
July27, 2000) (defining ancFexplainingOSI).
6 Such standards include: Intemet Protocol ("IP") and TCP, which define the
Intemet; htp and html, which define the World Wide Web; and Simple Mail Trans-
fer Protoco- ("SMTP") and Post Office Protocol 3 ("POP3), whiclh define Inter-
net-based e-mail.
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time or bear the expense of traveling by automobile to a variety of
physical stores and confronting increasing costs as they wish to ex-
pand the geographic scope of their shopping,
Concerns about "the digital divide" and "information redlining"9
are often overblown. While not everyone in the world- or even the
United States- can afford an Internet connection, the cost of bringing
electronic commerce ("e-commerce") to a poor person, or one located
in a rural area with poor infrastructure, is much lower with Internet
technology than with any preceding alternative. Now businesses can
set up shop with little more investment than that required of a con-
sumer. Wares can be visible and available for purchase by consumers
anywhere in the world. Costs of the Internet enterprise are indifferent
to the distance between consumer and merchant, except for shipping
costs for physical goods.1"
7 The attractiveness of the Internet to consumers, compared to other markets,
can be expressed as dC =ffd,1,p), where dC is the relative cost advantage of Internet-
based markets compared to the most attractive alternative. dis a function of the av-
erage distance to the most relevant sellers, i represents relative search costs of the
Internet market compared with search costs for obtaining the same information
without the Internet, and p represents the composite price difference between prod-
ucts offered on the Internet and comparable products available in alternative mar-
kets. The search cost variable is likely to be a inear function of the number of rele-
vant sellers. The price difference variable may be zero or negative, because most
current Internet vendors price at or above the levels for conventional sellers selling
the same products. The distance variable represents travel costs for the consumer to
visit the physical location of the merchant. It is not a linear function of distance
between buyer and seller. Most consumers would be indifferent to variations in
distance, up to, for instance, five miles. Beyond five miles, resistance to distance
would increase with distance, until one has to travel to another continent, when the
resistance to further travel would diminish. The shape of the distance function,
then, would be a flattened S-curve, with the first derivative positive throughout, and
the second derivative positive for shorter distances, zero for the middle range, and
negative for the longest distances.
8 See KGC Longworth, Di a Effon_ E nw rer Web oC le, CHICAGO TRB.,
Aug. 5, 2000, at 3 (definin. problem of a "digital divide" as unequal access to new
technologies and summarizing efforts to address this problem on a global leveD.
9 See Eric R. Columbus, Citilizing Cyh.'spa ce Pdic Pouerand the Ifonmtion Suer-
higbwry, 34 IAkV. J. ON LEGIS, 519, 521 (1997) (book review) (providing definition
of "information redlining as the systematic market-based alienation of the poor
from the sources of information needed to participate in democracy, earn an educa-
tion and compete for employment").
10 By using the Internet, an e-commerce vendor avoids the need to develop its
own network protocols, arrange for proprietar points of presence, and deliver client
software to potential consumers. All of these features are provided by the universal
standards of the Internet protocol suite and rapidly spreading coverage of generic
Internet backbones and Internet Service Providers.
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New intermediaries have arisen to make the global electronic mar-
ketplace more efficient. Search engines make it easier to find busi-
nesses and other Internet participants.11 New auction markets, such
as eBay,"2 have sprung up, making it possible to buy and sell almost
anything, regardless of the size and sophistication of buyer or seller.
Automated shopping agents, such as Priceline1 3 reduce search costs
for buyers and sellers.
To be sure, the costs of doing business on the Internet are not
zero nor is success assured, as many young entrepreneurs in Silicon
Valley and its imitators are learning- along with their venture capital-
ists." The technologies that make it easier to reach broader markets
and sell to a much larger class of purchasers do not eliminate the need
for good strategies for sources of supply, inventory management, and
other logistical functions, such as order fulfillment. Merely because an
electronic storefront can be reached by any consumer in the world
does not mean that, as a practical matter, it will be audible above the
increasing noise levels of other merchants struggling to reach their
customers.
The new Internet marketplace makes it possible to deliver services
desired by customers. These services include travel planning and res-
ervations; information products, such as news, music, and video en-
tertainment; and computer products, such as software. The Internet
also eliminates the need for warehousing and delivery of physical mer-
chandise. Nevertheless, business models for new products and serv-
ices are embryonic.
Despite entrepreneurial risk, the evidence, in terms of volume of
business conducted through the Internet and market capitalization of
Internet enterprises, overwhelmingly supports the proposition that the
Internet already has revolutionized global commerce and will continue
to draw a greater portion of trade under its umbrella.
Lower economic barriers to entry draw more small entities into
electronic markets because the minimum economic scale of doing
11 Se ag, Altavista, at'http://www.altavista.com (last visited Sept. 30, 2000);
Excite, at http://www.excite.com (last visited Sept. 30, 2000); Lycos, at http://www.
lycos.com (lst visited Sept. 30, 2000); Yahoo!, at http://www.yahoo.com (last vis-
ited Sept. 30,2000).
12 eBay, at http://www.ebay.com (last visited Sept. 30.2000).
13 Priceline, at http://www.priceline.com (last visited Sept. 30,2000).
14 SW, eg., Cpi Bicknell, Bankruptcy Lawyn Snl Blood, WIRED, http://www.
wired.com/news/pnnt/0,1294,19850,00.html (May 27, 1999) (describing how the
number of troubled loans at Silicon Valley Bank jumped to a six-year high in the
first quarter of 1999).
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business is less. Lower technical transaction costs for making deals
and for delivering services and software in information products draw
lower value transactions into electronic markets. The result is a set of
markets in which many more small entities do business with individu-
als and each other. Transactions in such markets are of lower average
value.
3. NEW TRANSAGTION COSTS ASSOGATED WITH
GLOBAL ELETcRoNicMARKETS
When all markets are global, both buyers and sellers encounter
new uncertainties that blunt some of the economic and technological
inducements to participate fully in the market. Trust associated with
established relationships is less available in a global market. Long es-
tablished mechanisms for resolving disputes are less affordable and
less effective.15
3.1. Trusting Strars
Markets that employ little technology rely on personal relation-
ships. When a consumer does business with his cousin or with a
neighbor of twenty-five years, experience and reputation reduce un-
certainty. One knows one's buyer and seller and easily can assess the
likelihood of being cheated or disappointed by merchandise or the
service being rendered.
The potential value of expanding the geographic scope of markets
is that buyers and sellers can reach beyond their cousins and neigh-
bors; however, as they do so, informal mechanisms of trust become
less available and uncertainty increases. The devil you know is re-
placed by the devil you don't, and conventional wisdom suggests that
risks are lower when dealing with the devil you know.
In the past, market economies have constrained the uncertainties
associated with expanding commerce beyond the universe of ac-
quaintances in two ways. First, enterprises with institutional reputa-
tions for quality and customer satisfaction, such as Sears & Roebuck,
McDonald's, and Holiday Inn, have developed. Second, legal dispute
resolution machinery has evolved so that disappointed and cheated
buyers and sellers can get economic relief against strangers. Such pre-
15 The structure of the transaction costs can be expressed as C = s + d + n,
where C is the total transaction cost; s is a function of the familiarity and reputation
of the other party;, d is a function of distance between buyer and seller, and n is a
function of the number of different political entities which may become involved in
the transaction.
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Internet legal machinery includes: consumer protection offices at-
tached to state attorneys general and the Federal Trade Commission,
small claims court, local registration requirements for foreign busi-
nesses, bonding requirements for some classes of service providers,
building permits, and governmental inspection services.1 These gov-
ernment-based mechanisms have always been supplemented by pri-
vate trust-enhancing associations, such as Underwriters Laboratory
seals on electrical products, membership and listings on stock and
commodities exchanges, and intermediation and guarantees by retail-
ers with established reputations."
Most formal legal dispute resolution machinery, however, is an-
chored in geographically based concepts of legal sovereignty. The
building inspector has jurisdiction within one municipality but not be-
yond. The attorney general can operate in her own state but not else-
where. The small claims court must have "personal jurisdiction" over
a defendant before it can afford meaningful relief.
Reputation and third party guarantees or seals are not inherently
tied to geographic sovereignty, but the value of a guarantee is corre-
lated with the reputation of the guarantor, and reputation historically
has been inversely correlated with distance."8
16 Se eg, CONSUMER PROTECTION, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ("FTC'),
BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROTECnON PROFILE, at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/
bcp.htm (last updated Aug. 2, 2000) (describing resources of FTC Bureau of Con-
sumer Protection); BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROTECTION, PENNSYLVANIA OFFICE
OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, at http://www.attomeygeneral.gov/ppd/bcp
/index.shtml (last visited Sept. 30, 2000) (describing function of state Bureau of
Consumer Protection); DEPARTMENT OF LICENSES AND INSPECTION, QIY OF
PHLADELPHIA, BuILDING PERMIT APPLICATONS, at http://www.pila.gov/
summary/license/building.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2000) (outlining process and
necessity of obtaining building permits in Philadelphia).
17 Soe; e , UNDERWRITERS LABORATORIES, INC, ABOUT UL, at http://
www.ul.com/about/index.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2000) (describing mission of
Underwriters Laboratories, Inc, a private safety testing organization); NASDAQ,
NASDAQ LISTING REQUIREMENT, ati/abe at http:7/www.nasdaq.com/about/
listing.stm (last visited Sept. 30, 2000) (listing safety precautions on NASDAQ stock
exchange); SEARS, RETURNS/CANCELLATIONS, awiabe at http://www.sears.com
(last visited Sept. 30, 2000) (discussing Sears's "Satisfaction guaranteed or your
money back" policy.
18 When reputation is established by word of mouth, the geographic scope of
reputation is linited by the geographic scope of conversations. When reputation is
established by print or radio or television, ihe geographic scope of reputation is lim-
ited by the circulation of print publications and thie range of radio and television
broadcast stations.
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3.2. Laws Enibrace cf aorahy
All modem legal systems limit formal choices by a practical exer-
cise of power.' In public and private international law, this translates
into the concept of sovereignty. A state's power within its own
boundaries is plenary,2" only recently limited by universal conceptions
of human rights. 1 Outside its boundaries, exercise of coercive power
is aggression because it necessarily intrudes upon the sovereign pre-
rogatives of other states. These linkages between sovereignty and ge-
ography are codified in the Rta wnt (Thirg oFo * Rd_atk Lawof
the Unit Stats. The Restatera is generally acknowledged to express
worldwide doctrines of international law as understood by the United
States.24 The linkages are also internalized into interstate jurispru-
dence within the United States in case law limiting legitimate exercises
of legal power by individual states under the Commerce and Due Pro-
cess Clauses.2 Legislatures and other rulemakers may not extend their
19 See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877) (discussing how, in the United
States, each state enjoys sovereignty over persons within its territory; except as lim-
ited by the Constitution).
20 See U.N. QiARTER art. 2, paras. 4, 7 (stating that the United Nations does
not have the authorityto interfere 'with a state's domestic sovereignt).
21 See Regina v. Bartle, Ex Parte Pinochet, 38 LLM. 581 (FIL. 1999) (allowing
extradition offormer head of state for violation of torture convention), available at
http://www parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/ld 99899/ldjudgmt/jd9903
24/pinol.htm; Julie Mertus, Rmiaeiing the Legily of H aririan Intewizor Les-sons jmKsow, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1743, 1752-53 (2000) (offering interpreta-
tion of UN. Charter that reconciles conflict between sovereignty and human rightslaw); Elizabeth E. Ruddick, The C .Comtmt jSoevgnty In '. Lain
Intenatiom7v n an.heIn Dpa 77 B.U.L. REV. 429,449 (1997) (dis-
cussing conflict between human rights law and sovereignty).
22 SeJohn Linareli, A nExanidntion the Propsed OhIm oIwr on in the Draft
Ce ef Crirrm A gitthe Perm an Seaity fMankirg 18 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT' L.
REv. 1 (1995) (explaining difficulty in defining aggression in international law); Leila
Nadya Sadat & S. Richard Carden, The New Imm~om ! Gim! Caot An Unsy
Rewkt 88 GEO. LJ. 381, 440 (2000) (explaining concept of aggression in evolu-
tion of humanitarian law); Walter Gary Sharp, Sr., I&eutadonl ObEgtions to Searhfor
aniA rrt War Cinihm: Gowzewnt Failue in the Fomrr Yupasia?, 7 DUKE J. COMP.
& INT'L L. 411, 426 (1997) (explaining difficulty in justifying enforcement of prohi-
bition against war crimes in territory of another state).
23 RESTATEMENT (IRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES (1987).
24 Id 5 3 (describing the Restatement's derivation from customary international
law and international agreements to which the United States is a party).
25 See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987) (ruling that
due process limits the exercise of personal jurisdiction by courts); Phillips Petroleum
Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985) (explaining that the Due Process and Commerce
Clause limit choice of local ha'; Intl Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)
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law to persons lacking relevant connections to the (geographically de-
fined) state of the rulemaker.26 Courts and other dispute resolution
bodies may not make decisions or apply rules to persons lacking con-
nections with their "geographically defined" venues.'
3.3. The Iertm's (llngf to Sozeidgnty
Despite the importance of rule certainty and dispute resolution to
the efficiency of impersonal markets, the very characteristics that
make the Internet an attractive marketplace also make it difficult to
govern under traditional concepts of sovereignty. Concepts of pre-
scriptive and adjudicative jurisdiction have evolved to accommodate
commerce extending beyond the boundaries of a particular sovereign,
but the jurisdictional concepts still depend upon localizing conduct.
Tort law rules can be applied to injuries that occur within a particular
sovereign jurisdiction.' Contract law rules can be applied to contracts
that are made or to be performed in a particular place!' Property
rules apply where the property is located.
The Internet makes it more difficult to localize legally relevant
conduct than preceding commerce technologies. Where is a contract
made when it is executed by the invisible interaction of server and cli-
ent software on computers located in two different countries, neither
of which may be the habitual residence of the buyer or seller?31
Where does tortious injuiy occur when a wrongdoer located halfway
around the world pirates intellectual property?" Where does tortious
(holding that activities within a forum by a salesman for a corporation were suffi-
cient to subject the corporation to jurisdiction within the forum).
26 Sxe Phifips Pani!m 472 U.S. at 804 (requiring connection between contro-
versy and state whose law is to be applied).
2 SeeAsai 480 U.S. at 102 (requrn purposeful availment of the benefits of
the sovereign asserting jurisdiction); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,
444 U.S. 286 (1980) (refining the "minimum contacts" standard set forth in I'I Shoe
Qo.); Zippo Mfg. v. Zippo Dot Corn, 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997) (holding
that the defendant purposefully availed itself of d-oing business in the forum state).
28 Se RESTATMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICr OF LAWS § 145 (1971) (providing
general rules for choice of lawin torts cases).
29 Id § 188 (enunciating a general rule for choice of law in contracts cases, in
absence of a choice by parties).
30 Id 5 222 (stating a general rule for choice of law in property cases).
31 See CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that
an agreement to offer software on the plaintiff's computer subjected the defendant
to jurisdiction in plaintiff's home forum .
32 See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349 (SD.N.Y.
2000) (rejecting fair use defense made byIntemet distributor of copyrighted works).
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injury occur when a hacker launches a denial of service attack that
clogs up the routers representing the only gateway to an e-commerce
vendor but located in another place arbitrarily determined by network
engineers? Do the courts of Virginia have in mnjurisdiction over eve-
ryone doing business on the Internet through a domain name merely
because the domain names are "located" on a root domain server in
Virginia?
33
Because of the difficulties of localizing conduct in Internet mar-
kets, allocating jurisdiction to a formal public institution is uncertain,
even as a theoretical matter.34
3.4. Beynd Thwry- EjndngDedsion
The law is adaptive and creative in working out theoretical solu-
tions to problems arising from new technologies. It is not intellectu-
ally difficult, when working from established principles of localizing
trans-border activities, to formulate rules that localize Internet con-
duct?5
Concluding that the rules emanating from a particular legislature
govern a transaction in a formal sense, or that a court or administra-
tive tribunal has personal jurisdiction over a foreign e-commerce ven-
dor, is not the end of the matter. The rules still must be enforced and
the adjudicative decisions turned into monetary relief or practical ces-
sation of illegal conduct?6 Meaningful enforcement and application
33 Coname Porsche Cars N. Arm, Inc. v. AllPorsche.com, Nos. 99-1804, 99-
2152, 2000 WL 742185 (4th Cir. June 9, 2000) (allowing in rem jurisdiction over
domain name), vbth Network Solutions, Inc. v. Umbro Int , Inc., 529 S.E.2d 80
(Va. 2000) (holding that domain name registration agreements for services were not
subject to garnishients).
34 See ABA JURISDICnON IN CYBERSPACE PROJECr, ACHIEVING LEGAL AND
BUSINESS ORDER IN CYBERSPACE: A REPORT ON GLOBAL JURISDICTION ISSUES
CREATED BY THE INTERNET 8 (2000); at http://www.kentlaw.edu/cyberlaw [here-
inafter CHICAGO-KENT/ABA JURISDICTION PRoJECr].
35 See Digi-Tel Holdings, Inc. v. Proteq Telecomms., Ltd., 89 F.3d 519, 523 (8th
Cir. 1996) (noting that telephone calls and faxes into the forum state are insufficient
by themselves to establish personal'jurisdiction); Northnip Kin Co. v. Compania
Productora Semillas Algodoneras Selectas, S.A._ 51 F.3d 1383 (8th Cir. 1995), c9 in
Initiatives, Inc. v. Korea Trading Corp., 991 F. Supp. 476, 479 (E.D. Va. 1997)
(holding that Spanish company ld sufficient contact with the United States to bring
the foreign corporation under U.S. jurisdiction); TSA, Inc. v. Nass, No. CIVA.96-
4509, 1997 WL 47612, at *2 (ED. Pa. Feb. 4, 1997) (finding that telephone calls by
themselves are insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction).
36 See Henry H Perxitt, Jr., Will dJudgnPr -fOn CQypa, 32 INT LAW.
1121, 1123 (1998) ("The real problem is turning a judgement supported by jurisdic-
tion into meaningful economic relief.").
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depend upon the practicality of asserting coercive control over prop-
erty or persons located within the boundaries of the rule issuing or
adjudicating sovereign37 or the willingness of other sovereigns to rec-
ognize and enforce foreign rules and decisions?' Whether such per-
sons or property can be located, and whether transnational recogni-
tion and enforcement will occur, are additional, and potentially large,
sources of uncertainty, in comparison to the uncertainty regarding
theories of jurisdiction.
3.5. The Rdationhip B eenudtion and Ir& ry L ability
Although the Internet's virtual marketplace is indifferent to na-
tional borders, and therefore to sovereignty, it does depend upon
physical devices, such as modems, telephone switching equipment,
routers, radio transmitters, receivers, antennas, and computers, that
function as servers and clients. While participants in small states con-
ceivably can use the public switched telephone system to connect to
Internet service providers and to other physical artifacts comprising
the Internet located entirely outside their states,39 the typical merchant
or consumer uses a local Internet service provider. The local provider
has leased lines, routers, and servers, and may have radio transmitting
and receiving apparatus in the same jurisdiction where the merchant
or consumer is located. Any legal system will focus on locally present
property as a justification for jurisdiction and, more importantly, as
the means for enforcing rules and decisions. This encourages legal in-
stitutions to impose liability on intermediaries as a way of reducing
uncertainty with respect to jurisdiction and enforcement power over
3 Sw Apostolic Pentecostal Church v. Colbert, 173 FYLD. 199 (ED. Mich.
1997) (discussing whether the federal marshal or state sheriff should execute a fed-
en judgment); Dorwart v. Caraway, 966 P2d 1121 (Mont. 1998) (discussing judg-
ment execution procedure in context of constitutional due process); THE BRUSSELS
CONVENTION ON JURISDICTION AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN
JUDGMENTS: PAPERS AND PRECEDENTS FROM THE JOINT CONFERENCE WITH THE
UNION DES AVOCIS EUROP-ENS (Gerald Moloney & Nicholas K. Robinson, eds.
1989), http://www.maths.tcd.ie/pub/ItishTaw/table.htm (discussing the practical
application of the Brussels Convention to enforce foreign judgments).
38 Corare de la Mata v. Am. Life Ins. Co., 771 F. Supp. 1375, 1383 (D. Del.
1991) (holding that reciprocity is not a prerequisite to recognition of a judgement),
vith ilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 228 (1895) (holding that comity requires red-
procity).
39 An example would be a consumer located in Skopje, Macedonia, who places
a long distance telephone call to a Microsoft Network point of presence in f~rank-
furt, Germany.
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more remote actors who may bear more direct responsibility for dis-
puted conduct.4
While intermediary liability represents a potential solution to the
legal uncertainty considered in Section 3.1., it is also a source of addi-
tional transaction costs4 1 When intermediaries face liability for con-
duct engaged in by their customers, they have an incentive to exclude
customers who may increase their risk Intermediaries who are risk
averse can undermine the Internet's potential as much as risk averse
end users.
4. SOLUIIONS FOR REDUCING LEGAL BARRIERS AND UNCERTAINTY
4.1. Taving Ccxepts
The concept of targeting is the best solution to the theoretical
challenge presented by difficulties in localizing conduct in Internet
markets.42 Targeting entails a market participant directing its sales or
purchasing activity to a particular jurisdiction.43 An Internet merchant
wishing to reduce the uncertainty associated with potential regulation
by nearly two hundred national sovereigns and thousands of subordi-
nate governmental entities can target only one or a few jurisdictions
whose legal regime it understands and accepts. Alternately, if such a
participant wishes to avoid the requirements or enforcement mecha-
nisms of a particular sovereign, it can exclude or "de-target" that ju-
risdiction. A growing number of judicial decisions in the United
40 See Kim L. Rappaport, In the Wake 9'Reno v. ACLU. he Coaira& Stm ge in
Wetern Cntiml Dbcracies uImthl?rt& atohipand Fre~mcfSe Oalim 13
AM. U. INTL L. REV. 765, 790-91 (1998) (describing prosecution of CompuServe
executive for material on Internet site that violated German Information and Com-
munications Services Act). In mid-2000 an anti-Nazi group in France sued Yahoo!
for making available material through an American Internet site that contravened
French law. See Steve Bold, Yaoo! In Onlim A uaion Lead Spat .ith Fmxh A uthisia,
NEWSBYTES NEWS NETWORK, May16, 2000, ailbleat 2000 WL 21177244.
41 When intermediaries are concerned about potential liability, they include the
expected value of liability into their costs of doing business.
42 See Zippo Mfg. v. Zippo Dot Corn., 952 F. Supp 119, 1123 (W.D. Pa. 1997),
acmtma in Mlehnium Enter. v. Millennium Music, LP, 33 F. Supp. 2d 907, 915-16
(D. Or. 1999) (explaining the Zippo continuum as a "sliding scale" under which the
"likelihood that personal jurisdition can be constitutionally exercised is directly
proportionate to the nature and quality of commercial activity that an entity con-
ducts over the Internet" and suggesting that jurisdiction exists over websites only
when the forum state is targeted).
43 See Neogen Corp. v. Neo Gen Screening, Inc., 2000 WL 1199949 (W.D.
Mich. Aug. 21, 2000) (analyzing case law in terms of targeting); CHiCAGO-
KENT/ABA JURISDICTION PROJECr, supra note 34, S 2.2.
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States' and guidance issued by administrative agencies such as the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission45 are refining formulas for target-
ing and de-targeting.
The targeting concept avoids the uncertainty associated with sub-
jecting an Internet merchant to the jurisdiction of any place where its
website is visible,46 which is usually everywhere in the world. On the
other hand, extensive de-targeting has the effect of excluding con-
sumers in de-targeted states from the benefits of global e-commerce.
4.2. HybridR datao Franmzorks
The geographic limitations on new application and enforcement
of regulations apply to public institutions exercising sovereign powers.
They do not apply to private entities.47 Accordingly, jurisdictional un-
certainties associated with transnational commerce on the Internet can
be reduced when rules are made and enforced by private rather than
public institutions.
The traditional difficulty with private regulation is that it may not
express the political consensus of democratic societies with respect to
values to be enforced48 or the balance of power to be struck between
44 See, eg, Miller v. Asensio, 101 F. Supp. 2d 395, 405 (D.S.C. 2000) (character-
izing cases as uniformly rejecting jurisdiction based on availability of passive web-
site).
45 SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, INTERPRETATION; USE OF
ELECMONIC MEDIA (Apr. 28, 2000), http://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/34-
42728.htm (providing guidance in applying federal securities law to electronic me-
dia); see also SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, INTERPRETATION;
STATEMENT OF THE COMMISSION REGARDING USE OF INTERNET WEBSITES TO
OFFER SECURITIES, SOLICIT SECURITIES TRANSACTIONS, OR ADVERTISE
INVESTMENT SERVICES OFFSHORE (Mar. 23, 1998), http://www.sec.gov
/rules/concept/33-7516.htm (explaining registration obligations for websites ais-
seminating irformation about the offsliore sale of securities and investment serv-
ices).
46 See Inset Sys. Inc., v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161, 165 (D. Conn.
1996) (finding that the defendant satisfied the minimum contacts component of per-
son i1jurisdiction based on the availability of defendant's website in the forum state).
47 See Daniel Bodansky, The Role of lntermtiowl Law in Hunmn Rights Litigtion in
the Una State, 82 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 456, 470 (1998) (noting that, even though
international law's limitations on adjudicative jurisdiction apply oiAly to states, federal
courts strive to interpret domestic jurisdictional statutes and rules to comport with
international law); Kathleen I'Txson, Note, ExtratoitoialJurisdiaion Uire the Thind
Restatenlm oFrign Rdatom Law f the United States, 12 FORDHAM INTL LJ. 127,
130-31 (1988) (explaining international law's limitations on jurisdiction in terms of
limitations on states).
48 See _gray Neil Weinstock Netanel, CQxhspa SdfGozennrw A Skeptical
ViewfiomLiera1Derrxratic Them, 88 CAL L. REV. 395 (2000) (arguing that selective
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stronger and weaker market participants49 As a result, few legal sys-
tems rely entirely on private regulation to protect consumers and small
businesses."0
Combining the jurisdictional strengths of private regulation with
the greater political legitimacy of public regulation requires develop-
ment of new hybrid frameworks. Public law can set minimum, and
relatively general, standards of conduct and provide backup enforce-
ment. Used in this way, public law defines the boundaries within
which a multiplicity of private regulatory regimes can work out de-
tailed rules, first-level dispute resolution, and rule enforcement ma-
chinery?'
The relatively general character of public law rules makes it easier
to achieve consensus among multiple sovereigns with different legal
traditions and varying political alignments. At the same time, it can
"trim the tails" off the distribution of private regulatory regimes 2 that
might be insufficiently protective of weaker parties, or too restrictive
of competition and innovation in the absence of the public law
framework 3
The space for private regulation allows not only the benefits of
contract-based jurisdiction that easily crosses national boundaries. It
also allows for a closer fit between regulatory details and technological
government regulation of cyberspace is warranted to protect and promote liberal
democratic ideals).
49 See European Commission Data Protection Working Party; Woking Dow-
nmnt J ng In&try Sdf Reguatior When Does It Make a Meazintfzd Contri1u to de
Lew] of Data Plwtwion in a Third C tn? (Jan. 14, 1998) (directing compliance with
non-legal rules that may be in force in the third country in question),
htt Zwweuropa.eutvlcomm/intermal-arket/en/ meia/dataprot/p-docs/
wp7en.htm.
50 BuREAu OF CONSUMER PROTECTION, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,
CONSUMER PROTECIION IN THE GLOBAL ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACE: LOOKING
AHEAD 15 (Sept. 2000) (calling for an increase in hybrid public and private efforts
towards regulation of e-commerce), awiab at http://www.ftc.g6v/bcp/icpw/
lookingahead/electrorncmkpl.pdf.
51 See gerrally Hery H. Perritt, Jr., The Intezmt Is (IMa i the Public ntMaiomd
Legnl4St 88 KY. LJ. 885 (2000) (discussing the role of pub c international law as
a framework for private treaties).
52 A set of regulatory regimes can be viewed along a continuum ranging from
least protective to most protective. "Tails" in a statistical distribution refer to the
extremes: in the example, the handful of most protective regimes would be one tail,
and the handful of least protective regimes would be the other tail. "Trimming the
tails" thus signifies elimting the statistical extremes and retaining only those
regulatory regimes that are moderately protective.
53 See Perritt, The Intenxt Is bangin the Public ntertioal Lea Syte s" note
51, at 891 (discussing generallythe nature of public intemationallaw).
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and market realities, thus enlisting the energ of competition and in-
novation in the service of regulatory efficacy.
Three promising examples of hybrid approaches are: (1) The
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers'
("ICANN's") regulation of Internet domain name assignment s5 and its
associated resolution of controversies between domain name holders
and trademark holders; (2) the acceptance by the United States gov-
ernment and the European Commission of a safe harbor for privacy
protection of data allowing basic norms for privacy protection to be
extended through private self-regulatory regimes;56 and (3) credit card
charge-back mechanisms that provide a cheap and readily available
dispute resolution mechanism for virtually all credit card based Inter-
net commerce5
4.3. Enli ang lr& res in Suport oSdflRgLation
Private regulatory regimes are a form of government. As such,
they must have legislators, judges, and sheriffs. 8 Private intermediar-
ies usually provide these quasi-governmental services. ICANN, for
instance, the new intermediary for the domain name regulatory re-
gime, promulgates rules for issuance and retention of domain names
and for adjudication of trademark/domain name controversies. 9
New dispute resolution intermediaries, such as administrative panels
formed under the World Intellectual Property Organization's
("CIPO's") dispute resolution rules adjudicate these controversies
14 See g ioralfy Henry I- Perritt, Jr., Cj4r SdfGom " Tour*Hall Dem-
racy orReteA-acwrdRoyadisnr, 12 BERKELEY TECH. LJ. 413 (1997) (discussing the de-
sirbility of self-governance for the Interet and private contract as a source of
authority for electronic communities).
55 SeePerritt, 7he Inewt is Crnk the Public lnterntiorl Legil Systen supra note
51, at 940-44 (discussing the scope of ICMtNN's regulatory responsibilities).
-1 See id at 932-40 (commenting on the procedures envisioned by the European
Commission and the United States in enforcing compliance with the safe harbor
rules).
57 See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Dispute Resdution in C space, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON
Disp. RESOL 675, 691-92 (2000).
58 See Perritt, C)bpace Sdf Gozwnm7F supra note 54, at 432 (asserting that elec-
tronic communities must offer normative rules for conduct, institutionalize rule-
making, and sanction rules violators).
59 See ICANN, UNIFORM DOMAIN-NAME DISPUrE RESOLUrION PoLIcy, at
http://www.icann.o rg/udr/up.htm (last updated June 17, 2000) ("Under the
policy, most types of trademark-based domain name disputes must be resolved by
agreement, court action or arbitration before a registrar will cancel, suspend or trans-
fer a domain name.").
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under the ICANN regulations.' Other intermediaries, such as do-
main name registrars, enforce administrative panel decisions by re-
voking or transferring domain names.6'
In the credit card charge-back regime, credit card issuers are in-
termediaries adjusting disputes between merchants and consumers.
They can decline to credit merchants who fail to deliver promised
merchandise or services and revoke credit for consumers who refuse
to pay for merchandise or services that are delivered pursuant to
agreement.62
Private privacy regulatory regimes depend upon intermediaries
who can revoke membership or the seals that immunize members or
holders from direct action by public authorities.63
The role of these intermediaries is different from the role of un-
willing intermediaries, such as Internet service providers or telecom-
munications entities, drawn into regulatory roles by the threat of li-
ability imposed on them for the conduct of users of their services.
These differences may mitigate some of the harm to the Internet's
future development that would result from adding to the uncertainty
of intermediaries, as considered in Section 3.1. After all, intermediar-
ies whose primary purpose is mlemaking, enforcement, and dispute
resolution have volunteered for these tasks and are unlikely to curtail
their investment because their experience will be in line with their ex-
pectations.
60 See WIPO, SUPPLEMENTAL RULES FOR UNIFORM DOMAIN NAME DIsPUrE
RESOLUnON POLICY (in effect as of Dec. 1, 1999) ("These supplemental rules are
to be read and used in connection with the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dis-
pute-Resolution Policy approved by [ICANN] on Oct. 24, 1999."), at http://arbiter.
'wipo.int/domains/ruessupplemental.html.
61 See ICANN, REGISTRAR ACQ=EDITATION AGREEMENT § 11(K), at http://
www.icann.org/nsi/icann-raa-04nov99.htm (approved Nov. 4, 1999) (last modified
Nov. 9, 1999) ("During the term of this Agreement, Registrar shall have in place a
policy and procedure for resolution of disputes concerning [Second-Level domain]
names. In the event that ICANN adopts a policy or procedure for resolution of
disputes concerning SLD names that by its terms applies to Registrar, Registrar shall
adhere to the policy or procedure.").
62 See Robert D. Cooter & Edward L. Rubin, A Theoy cfLcss A lloation for Con-
sun.rP aynt, 66 TEx. L. REV. 63, 99-102, 101 n.137 (1987) (describing the rights
of card issuers to cancel cardholder's account under certain circumstances); Perritt,
Dispute Resdtin in Cy)&npa supra note 57, at 690.
63 Sea eg, BBBOnline, at http://www.bbbonline.org (last visited Sept. 30,
2000) (offering a process by which to file a complaint against an offending website
for use of personally identifiable information); TRUSTe, at http://www.truste.org
(last visited Sept. 30, 2000) (certifying a subject website with a visible logo and inclu-
sion of privacy statement that adheres to privately established privacy policies).
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Three kinds of intermediary roles exist. The first role is per-
formed by seal organizations that require members and users of their
seals to disclose member policies and then adhere to them.'4 The in-
termediary in the first role performs no rulemaking function, but sim-
ply ensures that members have followed their own rles." This role
involves little risk of private censorship because both members and
intermediaries simply follow their own rules. The second role in-
volves intermediaries who perform obligations to enforce rules
adopted by public institutions.66 While there are transaction costs that
may, at the margin, exclude some potential intermediaries, there is lit-
tle risk of private censorship. The third role involves the greatest risk
of private censorship and exclusion of risky content and commerce."
This role involves intermediaries who are subject to liability for harm
caused by content originators. To reduce the risk of liability, interme-
diaries performing the third role have a strong incentive to exclude
any content or commerce that poses a risk.
Private intermediaries who perform a rulemaking function have
always stimulated questions about legitimacy and fairness."
How can accountability be assured in rulemaking? What is the
right balance between majority will and minority rights? When con-
stituencies are too large for the members to express themselves indi-
vidually, what are permissible representation arrangements? These are
the questions that always challenge makers of constitutions for public
64 See, eg, BBBOnline, supra note 63 (providing a procedure through which to
file complaints against websites that have invaded personal privac); TRUSTe, supra
note 63 (claiming to promote trust and confidence on the Internet by helping users
find trustworthywebsites).
65 Sep eg, TRUSTE, HOW TO JOIN THE TRUSTE PROGRAM, at http://www.
truste.org/webpublishers/pubjoi.html ast visited Sept. 30, 2000) (describing how
to become eligible for a TRUSTe seal).
6 See FTC Children's Online Privacy Protection Rules, 16 C.F.. S 312.10
(2000) (providing a safe harbor to intermediaries that enforce statutory and regula-
tory limitations on the acquisition and use of information from children).
67 See HR. CoNF. REP. No. 104-458, at 193-94 (1996) (analyzing 5 230 of the
Communications DecencyAct of 1996, 47 U.S.C S 230).
68 SeeJodyFreeman, The PrizateRde inPubic Gorernrx 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543
(2000) (proposing a conception of governance as a set of negotiated relationships
between public and private actors.)
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institutions.69 They also challenge the designers of private regulatory
regimes and may yet wreck ICANN
Additionally, what are the rules for private dispute resolution? Is
the impartiality of decisionmakers assured? Did both parties receive
appropriate notice and opportunity to participate? Were appropriate
rules of evidence applied? Did the record develop in the formal pro-
ceeding justify the decision? These are questions that regularly chal-
lenge writers of civil practice statutes and civil procedure and evidence
rules." These same questions confront designers of private arbitration
machinery, designers of the Virtual Magistrate,"3 the WIPO dispute
resolution machinery," and the plethora of other virtual dispute reso-
lution bodies connected with e-commerce 5' Constitutional contro-
69 See eg, CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, MRACLE AT PHLADELPHIA: THE
STORY OF THE CONSTITUTONAL CONVENTION MAY TO SEPTEMBER 1787, 69-74
(1966) (describing how Constitutional Convention delegates settled on a method for
electing members of Congress); ALEXANDER HAMILTON, ET AL, THE FEDERALIST
PAPERS (Benjamin Fletcher Wright, ed., Belknap Press 1974) (arguing, in part, that
government is a matter of choice).
70 See ICANN, PRELIMINARY REPORT: MEETING OF THE ICANN BOARD IN
YOKOHAMA July 16, 2000) (reporting on changes in ICANN bylaws to resolve dis-
agreements about at-large menbers and selection of board members by them),
http://www.icann.org/minutes/prelim-report-16jul00.htm; ICANN, PUBLIC
COMMENT FORUM, AT-LARGE ELECTIONS: PROPOSED RULES FOR SELF-
NOMINATION (Comments through July 7, 2000) (discussing, in a particapatoryfo-
rum, at-large membership selection and representation), at lttp://www.icann.org/
mbx/selfnomination.
71 See Lauren Robel, Fraatmd Praxb= The Cil Justie Rom Act of 1990, 46
STAN. L. REV. 1447, 1467 (1994) (reporting on the controversy over the balance
between local rules and the Fedeial Rules of Civil Procedure); Carl Tobias, Cdision
Coure inFaeral Cai1Discomy, 145 F.R.D. 139, 140 (1993) (describing the controver-
sies over the content of civil discovery and sanctions rules).
72 See Publicis Communication v. True North Communications, Inc., 206 F.3d
725 (7th Cir. 2000) (affirming judicial confirmation of an arbitration order decided
under the New York Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Ar-
bitral Awards); Lander Co. v. MMP Invs., Inc., 107 F.3d 476, 478-79 (7th Cir. 1997)
(discussing the relationship between the New York Convention and domestic
United States arbitration).
73 See VMAG: The Virtual Magistrate: Online Dispute Resolution, at http://
www.vmag.com (last visited Sept. 30, 2000) (providing dispute resolution among
online computer users, computer operatiors and persons harmed by the posting of
defamatory online messages).
74 See WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION ARBITRATION AND
MEDIATION CENTER, MEDIATION RULES, http://www.arbiter.wi7po.int/mediation
/mediation-rules/index.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2000) (providing supplemental
dispute resolution rules).
75 See, eg., Interet Neutral, at http://wwwintemetneutral.com (last visited
Sept. 30, 2000) (offering online dispute resolution services); see also WEBdispute, at
http://www.webdispute.com/ (last visited Sept. 30, 2000) (offering online dispute
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versies in developing the framework for democratic rulemaking and
for fair adjudication do not evaporate when these governmental func-
tions are privatized. The controversies simply occur in private arenas
rather than public ones. However, the inadequacies of private rule-
making will inevitably spill over into the public arena. This must be
taken into account when public institutions determine their willing-
ness to cede power to private regulatory networks! 6
4.4. OherFoms 9TTmst Enbanoevt
Commerce does not only depend only on formal legal rules and
the availability of formal dispute resolution machinery. It also, some-
times predominantly, depends upon informal mechanisms of enhanc-
ing trust. Personal and familial relationships facilitate possible trans-
actions in many local markets. Traditional transnational business
mechanisms, such as standby letters of credit,'" performance bonds,78
and accounts receivable financing,"9 oiled the wheels of international
business transactions long before the ascendance of the Internet by
providing trustworthy guarantees.
New enhancing mechanisms also facilitate e-commerce. eBay is
especially innovative in this regard. Their innovations include online
consumer reports of seller reliability"O available with the click of a
mouse in the same space where a transaction can be consummated,
escrow mechanisms to assure seller and buyer performance," and pri-
resolution services); iLeveL, at http://www.ilevel.com (last visited Sept. 30, 2000)
(offering online dispute resolution).
76 See 146 CONG. REc. S4297-02 (daily ed. May 23, 2000) (statement of Sen.
Hollings) ("Intemet industry self-regulation efforts have failed to protect adequately
consumer privacy.).
77 See San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. Bank Leumi, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 20, 23 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1996) (stating that standby letters of credit have evolve into guarantees of
a customer's promised performance to a third party).
78 See United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Braspetro Oil Servs., Co., 199 F.3d 94,
98 (2d Cir. 1999) (describing performance bonds).
79 See Mara E. Trager, Note, Tournis A Pradabk Law on lenitiorl Rehabes
Finizn. 7he UNC1TRAL Cownn 31 N.Y.U J. INT' L. & POL. 611 (1999) (de-
scribing accounts receivable financing).
80 EBAY, WHY EBAY IS SAFE, at ht://pages.ebay.com/help/basics/n-is-ebay-
safe.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2000)describmg the company's feedback forum
where users can read comments on the reputations of previous buyers and sellers).
81 EBAY, EscRow OVERVIEW, at http://pages.ebay.com/help/community/
escrow.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2000).
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vate insurance to compensate for nonperformance! 2 These mecha-
nisms are developed and deployed unilaterally, motivated by an entre-
preneurial desire to enhance buyer and seller trust in a new kind of
auction space.
5. INITIATIVES TO TRANSLATE THEORYrNTo REALITY
It is not enough for a law professor or a policymaker to conceive
of ways to reduce legal barriers to e-commerce. Good ideas must be
translated into public law and commercial practice. The boundary
between public and private law must be expressed in public law that
defines the respective roles of different institutions in hybrid regula-
tory regimes. 3
The Hague Conference on Private International Law" has one
hundred years of experience in facilitating multilateral agreement
among nations on public law frameworks for private law.' Presently,
82 EBAY, FRAUD PREVENTION AND INSURANCE, at http://pages.ebay.com/
help/community/insurance.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2000).
83 See Perritt, CQybspae Sef Gozenvre7m sura note 54, at 413 (discussing the po-
litical and legal limitations of contract law as a sole source of governance). See gemr-
ally Christopher Wilkinson, Internet Domain Name Administration, Address to the
Center for Information Law and Policy Conference (Oct. 8, 1997), at http://www.
ispo.cec.be/eif/dns/dnsadmin.htnl (discussing the need for political oversight and
dispute resolution in self-governing communities).
84 HAGUE CONFERENE ON PRIVATE INTERNAnONAL LAW, FOTURE HAGUE
CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION AND THE EFFECTS OF
JUDGMENTS IN Q'IL AND COMMERCIAL MATIERS, http://www.hcch.net/e/ work-
prog/infosheet.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2000) (describing the Hague Conference
on Private International Law as an inter-govenmental organization founded in 1893
to focus on the progressive unification of the rules of private international Ia%).
85 Se eg. Hague Conference on Private International Law, Convention on Ju-
risdiction, Applicable Law and Recognition of Decrees Relation to Adoptions (Nov.
15, 1965) (establishing common provisions on adoption among signatory states),
http://www.hch.net/e/conventions/menu3e.html; Hague Conference on Private
International Law, Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial
Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters (Nov. 15, 1965) (agreeing on rules gov-
erig transmission of judicial and extra-judicial documents for service abroad),
http://www.hcch.net/e/conventions/menu4e.html; Hague Conference on Private
International law, Convention on Recognition of the Legal Personality of Foreign
Companies, Associations, and Foundations (June 1, 1956) (establishing international
rules for legal recognition of business entities), http://www.hcch.net/e/conventions
/menu07e.html; Hague Conference on Private International Law, Convention Re-
lating to the Settlement of the Conflicts between the Law of Nationality and the
Law of Domicile (June 15, 1955) (establishing guidelines for harmonizing conflicts
regarding of nationality of domicile), http://www.hcch.net/e/conventions/
menu06e.htnl; Hague Conference on Private International Law, Convention on
Civil Procedure (Mar. 1, 1954) (establishing guidelines for international judicial pro-
cedures), http://www.hcch.net/e/conventuons/menuO2e.htrnl.
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the Conference is considering a comprehensive treaty for judicial ju-
risdiction and enforcement of foreign civil judgments.86 The Confer-
ence has an opportunity to work out basic ground rules for localizing
conduct in Internet markets, through targeting and other mecha-
nismsY It also has an opportunity to define the relationship between
private regulation and public enforcement.8
The Chicago-Kent/American Bar Association Internet Jurisdic-
tion Project, completed in August 2000,s" defined the basic challenges
presented by e-commerce technology to traditional legal conceptions
of prescriptive and adjudicative jurisdiction.' The Project also con-
sidered the differing needs, balances of power, and traditional industry
practices in some nine areas of concern such as consumer protec-
tion;9' privacy, 2 intellectual property,93 financial services and bank-
ing,94 and sale of professional services.95
The U.S. Congress, the Clinton/Gore Administration, and the
European Commission have embraced some core principles that they
are translating into actual law-framing hybrid regulation. Most of the
new federal legislation for e-commerce at the close of the century em-
86 See Hague Conference on Private International Law, Preliminary Draft Con-
vention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgements in Civil and Commerical Matters
(Oct. 30, 1999) (proposing international riles of personal jurisdiction), http://www.
hcch.net/e/conventions/aft3 6e.html.
87 See Catherine Kassedjian, Elamrc ConrrearIternntio Juisdiaion (2000)
(summarizing discussions at an expert meeting organized in Ottawa by the Hague
Conference on Private International Law at the invitation of the Canadian govern-
ment), http://www.hcch.net/e/workprog/jdgrn.html.
88 In an experts conference convened by the ague Conference in Ottawa in
2000, the author suggested that the draft convention exception for choice of forum
clauses enforceability for consumer contracts could be conditioned on the consum-
ers not having available to them an acceptable private dispute resolution alternative.
See id (noting that countries want to encourage e-commerce, but that consumers will
be less apt to use the Internet if they are not confident).
89 CHICAGO-KENT/ABAJURISDICiiONPROJEcr, supra note 34.
90 Id at 26-36 (analyzing how technology has changed jurisdictional paradigms).
91 Id at 93-103 (discussing difficulties in ensuring consumer protection on the
Internet).
92 Id at 103-19 (examining the jurisdictional aspect of laws that concern the
collection of personal information for commercial purposes).
93 Id at 119-30 (discussing the impact of internationalization on intellectual
property).
94 Id at 130-43. (discussing jurisdictional aspects of banking and payment sys-
tems as applied to the Internet).
95 Id at 157-64 (discussing the example of the sale of online medical services).
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braces some form of safe harbor for private regulation. 6 Europe has
become more sympathetic to the contribution that private dispute
resolution can make to protect legitimate interests in e-commerce and
appears open to a mix of public and private regulation!'
6. PROSPECTS FORSUCCESS
What once seemed like intractable legal theoretical problems now
seem not so intractable. While it would be unduly optimistic to say
there is no work left for legal theorists and authors of law review arti-
cles, it is a reasonable to assert that the basic outlines of useful regu-
latory approaches to enhance trust, reduce transaction costs, and allow
e-commerce to flourish on the Internet are available."
Now it is the turn of real world actors to put their muscle where
their mouth is. Proponents of private regulation must now occupy
the space afforded them by public policy. They must actually deploy
and honor private regulatory systems that are linked to widely em-
braced norms that provide real enforcement with teeth against rule
violators and offer accessible and fair dispute resolution machinery to
consumers and other small entities.'
96 See Children's Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, 15 U.S.CS. S 6503
(2000) (statin~ that an operator of an online service may satisfy the requirements of
the Act by following a set of self-regulatory guideline); see aso Digital Millenim
Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2868-69 (1998) (providing that, under
certain prescribed conditions, it is not a violation of the Act for a person to circum-
vent a technological measure that controls access to a work protected under the act).
97 See ag., European Commission, EEJ-NET Tozwrds a European Extra-Judidal
Netumk for Resoi Cowmurr Disptes-Lisenone on 5-6 May 2000, at
http://europa.eu.int/conum/consumers/poi--Y/,devefopments/accejust/acce just0
7 en.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2000) -escribing how the development of-EEJ-
IT will enhance consumers' rights and confidence regarding cross-border cases
within the EU); see also European Commission, Working Party on the Protection of
Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data, Working Document:
Judging Industry Self-Regulation (Jan. 14, 1998) (analyzing the role of industry
regulation of privacy issues), http://europa.eu.int/comni/ine-malmarket/en/media
/dataprot/ wpdocs/-wpten.htm.
98 See eg, CHICAG-KENT/ABA JURISDICIioN PRoJECT, sra note 34 (pro-
viding an outline of regulatory approaches for enhancing trust, reducing transaction
costs, and allowing e-commerce to flourish on the Internet).
99 See The Inw anfdFaeral Caams: Issues ani Cbsades: Ozeigt Her Befo the
Hose Crrntn on thefudicary, 106th Cng. (June 29, 2000) (statement of Henry H.
Perritt, Jr., Dean of Chicago-College of L._) (advocating new initiatives for private
self-regulation), at http://www.house.gov/Udic'ary,/perr0629.htm; A toatizeDisplt
Resdton for Comaurr Trasaaiom in tte Boes Online Marketplao, Testnvy Befoe the
Federal Trade Conaission and the U.S. Dqet of Comwe (June 6, 2000) (statement of
Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Dean of Chicago-Kent College of Law) (discussing the role of
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Public policynakers must follow through on their commitments,
in principle, to hybrid regulation and allow reasonable diversity and
innovation in regulatory regimes even when they differ from tradi-
tional public agency approaches." °
alternative dispute resolution in online marketplaces), at http://www.kentlaw.edu
/perttprofesorperrtt/ftcadrtesty3.html.
100 Se Heny H. Perritt, Jr., Interraiod A dninistratiw Lawfor the I&tnx. Mem.
nisnz A a= ity, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 871, 871-74 (1999) (proposing a frame-
work for an international Internet regulatory regime that does not violate the U.S.
Constitution).
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